Inspired by socially influenced decision making mechanisms such as the collective behavior of cancer cells, honey bees searching for a new colony or the mobility of bacterial swarms, we consider a Mean Field Games (MFG) model of collective choice where a large number of agents choose between multiple alternatives while taking into account the group's behavior. For example, in elections, individual interests and collective opinion swings together contribute in the crystallization of final decisions. At first, the agents' decisions are determined by their initial states. Subsequently, the model is generalized to include a priori individual preferences towards the destination points. For example, personal preferences that transcend party lines in elections. We show that multiple strategies exist with each one of them defining an epsilon Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective decision making occurs when a large number of agents choose between multiple alternatives while influenced by the group's behavior. This phenomenon is abundant in most social structures, e.g., in socio-economic systems [1] , biological populations [2] , or human societies. Socially influenced decision making is characterized by the weak coupling of the agents, i.e., (i) they are considerably influenced by the (anonymous) group's behavior, (ii) their isolated individual behaviors have negligible impact on the population's attitude and (iii) they collectively reproduce the global behavior of the group. For example, in elections, an individual-social trade off occurs, where individual interests and collective opinion swings together contribute in the crystallization of final decisions [3] - [5] .
A related topic in economics is discrete choice models where an agent chooses between multiple alternatives such as the mode of transportation [6] , entry and withdrawal from the labor market, or residential location [7] . In many circumstances, these individual choices are influenced by the so called "Peer Effect", "Neighbourhood Effect" or "Social Effect". For example, smoking decision in schools [8] . Brock and Durlauf propose in [9] a static binary discrete choice model of a large population, which takes into account the social effect as represented by the mean of the population. They use an approach similar to MFG to show that, for an infinite size population, each agent can predict the mean of the population by a fixed point calculation, and make a decentralized choice based upon its prediction. Moreover, they show that multiple anticipated means may exist. Our analysis leads to similar insights for a dynamic noncooperative multiple choice game, including situations where the agents have limited information about the dynamics of other agents.
In this paper, we consider situations where a large number of agents must move, within a finite time horizon, from their initial positions towards one of multiple destination points. Along the path, they must remain grouped and develop as little effort as possible. A related topic, in stochastic optimal control, is the "Homing" problem which was introduced first by Whittle and Gait in [10] and studied later in [11] , [12] for example. However, this problem is concerned with situations where a single agent tries to reach one of multiple predefined targets.
Our purpose is to model situations where individual decisions both depend on and collectively influence the group's behavior. In [13] , we considered the binary choice case where each agent knows the exact initial conditions of the other players. In this paper, we consider a model with multiple destination points. Moreover, we assume that each agent has limited information about the other agents' initial states in the form of a common initial probability distribution. This would represent, for example, the individual opinions privacy in the elections example. In addition to the randomized limited information about the initial states, we generalize the problem to consider nonuniform agents with initial preferences towards the final destinations. For example, even though influenced by the exogenous peers' smoking behavior, a teenager's decision to smoke depends on a priori affinities towards the final decision "smoking" or "non smoking". These affinities are the result of many endogenous factors, such as education, parental pressure, financial condition, health, cigarette's taste etc. In the elections example this would reflect personal preferences that transcend party lines for example.
A. Mathematical Model
We consider a noncooperative dynamic game, involving N agents, with identical linear dynamicṡ
where x i ∈ R n is the state of agent i and u i ∈ R m its control input. We assume that each agent has a limited information about the other agents initial conditions in the form of a statistical distribution. Thus, we assume that the initial conditions x 0 i , i = 1, . . . , N , are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) on some probability space (Ω, F , P). Each agent i is associated with an individual cost function
x j , q, r are positive constants and M is a large positive number. These costs force the agents to stay grouped around the mean, to expend as little effort as possible and to reach, before a time T , one of the predefined destinations p j , j = 1, . . . , l. We seek an −Nash equilibrium [14] , a sort of Nash equilibrium approximation, where converges to zero as the size of the population goes to infinity. Definition 1: Consider N players, a set of strategy profiles S = S 1 × · · · × S N and for each player k a payoff function J k (u 1 , . . . , u N ), ∀(u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ S. A strategy (u * 1 , . . . , u * N ) ∈ S is called an −Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J k , if there exists an > 0 such that for any fixed
Inspired by the MFG theory [14] - [17] , we seek a set of decentralized strategies satisfying the −Nash property. To compute its strategy, each agent will then need only to know its own state and the common initial distribution of the agents. The minimum term in the cost makes the problem non-standard with respect to the Mean Field Games (MFG) literature cited below. Unlike these standard papers, the proofs, given in this paper, for the existence of a fixed point macroscopic behavior are based on topological fixed point theorems, namely Brouwer's and Schauder's fixed point Theorems. This results in weak assumptions and multiplicity of solutions. The latter would explain the existence of multiple social behaviors in many similar situations. However, as it will be shown later, the computation of these fixed points requires more sophisticated methods than the simple iterations used in the case of contraction maps. As described in [14] , [15] , [17] , the MFG approach assumes a continuum of agents to which one can ascribe an assumed given deterministic macroscopic behavior (the mean field), captured here by the mean trajectoryx set equal to some posited yet unknown deterministic trajectoryx. The cost functions being now decoupled, each agent optimally tracksx. The resulting control laws depend on the local states andx. The solution of the tracking problem is presented in Section II. By implementing the resulting decentralized strategies in their dynamics, the agents reproduce a new candidate tracking path obtained as the mean agent population trajectory. In line with MFG analysis, the posited tracked path is considered an acceptable candidate only if it is replicated by the mean of the agents when they optimally track it. Thus, we look for candidate trajectories that are fixed points of the tracking path to tracking path map defined above. The fixed points of the tracking path to tracking path map are studied in Section III. In Section IV, the problem is generalized to include initial preferences towards the destination points.
In this case, the agents are assumed to be nonuniform and each agent has limited information about the other agents dynamic parameters, in the form of a statistical distribution over the matrices A and B. We show in Section V that the decentralized strategies developed when tracking the fixed point trajectories in all the cases considered above constitute −Nash equilibria with going to zero as N goes to infinity. In Section VI we provide some numerical simulation results, while Section VII presents our conclusions.
B. Notation
The following notation is used throughout the paper. C(X, Y ) denotes the set of continuous functions from a normed vector space X to Y ⊂ R k with the standard supremum norm . ∞ . x i:j denotes the vector (x i , x i+1 , . . . , x j ). P(A) denotes the probability of an event A. E x denotes the expectation with respect to the mesure induced by the random variable x. 1 X denotes the indicator function of a subset X. The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by M T . I k refers to the identity k × k matrix. Subscript i is used to index entities related to the agents. Subscripts j and k are used to index entities related to the home destinations. {X ≤ x} denotes the set {ω ∈ Ω|X(ω) ≤ x} where X is a random variable on some probability space (Ω, F , P) and x ∈ R.
Remark 1: For the proofs of theorems and lemmas one can refer to [18] .
II. TRACKING PROBLEM AND BASINS OF ATTRACTION
Following the MFG approach and the analysis in [13] , we assume the trajectoryx(t) in (2) to be given for now and equal tox(t). The cost function (2) can be written
where
Assuming a full (local) state feedback, the optimal control for (3) is
where u * ik is the optimal solution of the simple linear quadratic tracking problem with cost function J ik , namely [19] 
with corresponding optimal costs
and where Γ, β k and δ k are respectively matrix-, vector-, and real-valued functions, satisfying the following backward propagating differential equations:
with the final conditions
We summarize the above analysis in the following lemma. Lemma 1: The tracking problem (3) has a unique optimal control law
where Γ, β j , δ j are the unique solutions of (5a)-(5c), and
By solving (5b) and (5c), (7) can be written as follows:
Given any continuous pathx(t), there exist l basins of attraction where all the agents initially in D j (x) go towards p j for j = 1, . . . , l. Therefore, the mean of the population is highly dependent on the structure of D j (x), j = 1 . . . , l.
Optimal control laws (6) depend on the tracked pathx(t) and the local state x i . As mentioned above, each agent should reach one of the predefined destinations. The next lemma establishes that for any control horizon length T, M can be made large enough that each agent reaches an arbitrarily small neighborhood of some destination point by applying the control law (6) .
Lemma 2: Suppose that the pair (A, B) is controllable and the agents are optimally tracking a pathx(t) that is replicated by the mean of the population. Then, for any > 0 there exists an M > 0 such that each agent, at time T , is in a ball of radius and centered at one of the potential final destinations of the agents.
III. FIXED POINT
Having presented the solution of the general tracking problem, we now look for candidate continuous pathsx(t) which are sustainable, in that they are replicated as means of the agent population under the associated optimal tracking policies. We start our search for a fixed point path by replacingx in (2) by a continuous pathx. By Lemma 1, there exist l regions D j (x) such that the agents initially in D j (x) select the control law − 1 r B T Γx+β j when trackinĝ x. By substituting the solution of (5b) in (6) and the resulting control law in (1), we show that the mean of a generic agent with initial condition x 0 i is equal tō
where µ 0 is the initial population mean. Equation (11) defines an operator G ∞ that maps the tracked pathx to the meanx ∞ . G ∞ and its fixed points if any, only depend on the initial statistical distribution of the agents. By replacing the probabilities in (11) by an arbitrary λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) ∈ [0, 1] l , we define a new map
Lemma 3: Consider λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) ∈ [0, 1] l . T λ has a unique fixed point equal to
with initial conditionsR 1 (0) = I n ,R 2 (0) = 0.
We now define
The next theorem establishes the existence of a fixed point of G ∞ . We define F ∞ a map from [0, 1] l into itself such that
Assumption 1 : We assume that P 0 is such that the P 0 −measure of hyperplanes of dimension lower than n is zero.
Theorem 4: The following statements hold: 1)x is a fixed point of G ∞ if and only if there exists
has a fixed point (equivalently G ∞ has a fixed point). In Theorem 4, the first point shows that computing the anticipated macroscopic behaviors is equivalent to computing all the λ's satisfying (15) under the corresponding constraint onx(t). To compute the λ satisfying (15) , each agent is assumed to know the initial statistical distribution of the agents. Multiple λ's may exist. Hence, an a priori agreement on how to choose λ should exist. In that respect, agents may implicitly assume that collectively they will opt for the λ (assuming it is unique!) that minimizes the total expected population cost
The latter can be evaluated if the initial statistical distribution of the agents is a shared information.
A. Computation of The Fixed Points
The map F ∞ is not necessary a contraction. Hence, it is sometimes impossible to compute its fixed points by the simple iterative method λ k+1 = F ∞ (λ k ). Moreover, the computation of its Jacobian matrix inverse is computationally expensive since F ∞ is a vector of probabilities of some regions delimited by hyperplanes. Hence, we use Broyden's method [20] , a Quasi-Newton method, to find a solution for the nonlinear equation (15) . Unlike Newton's method, this method updates the inverse of the Jacobian, at the root estimate, recursively. Having computed a fixed point λ, the agents can compute the corresponding fixed point of G ∞ ,x which is equal to R 1 (t)µ 0 + R 2 (t)p λ .
IV. NONUNIFORM POPULATION WITH INITIAL PREFERENCES
In the previous section, the agents' final decisions are dictated by their initial positions. In the following, we generalize the model by considering that, in addition to their initial positions, the agents are affected by a priori opinion. Moreover, we assume in this section that the agents have nonuniform dynamics. We consider N agents with nonuniform dynamicṡ
We define the individual cost function
It is convenient, when considering the limiting population, to represent the limiting sequences of
..,N by two independent random variables θ and M in compact sets Θ and W . Let us denote the empirical measures of the sequences
1 {Mi∈A} for all (Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that P N θ and P N M have weak limits P θ and P M . For further discussions about this assumption, one can refer to [21] .
We develop the following analysis for a generic agent with an initial position x 0 , dynamical parameters θ = (A θ , B θ ) and initial preference vector M = (M 1 , . . . , M l ). Assuming an infinite size population, we start by trackingx(t) a posited deterministic although initially unknown continuous path. We can then show that this tracking problem has a unique optimal control function
are the unique solutions oḟ
and
The solution of Riccati equation (19a) is not the same for all the agents and depends on the initial preference vector M and the destination points. Hence, the basins of attraction are now regions delimited by quadratic form surfaces in R n . This fact complicates the structure of the operator that maps the tracked path to the mean as it is shown later. Thus, the proof of the existence of a fixed point requires an abstract, Banach space version of Brouwer's fixed point theorem, namely Schauder's fixed point theorem [22] . We define
The state of the generic agent is then
Assumption 2: We assume that E x 0 < ∞. The functions defined by (19a),(19b) and (19c) are continuous with respect to M and θ which are defined on compact sets. M , θ and x 0 are independent. Thus, under assumption 2, the mean of the population can be computed using Fubini-Tonelli's theorem as follows
Equation (22) defines an operator G p from the Banach space (C([0, T ], R n ), . ∞ ) into itself which maps the tracked pathx to the corresponding meanx, considered as another potential tracked path. In the next theorem, we show that G p has a fixed point. Assumption 3 : We assume that P 0 is such that the P 0 −measure of quadratic form surfaces is zero.
Theorem 5: G p has a fixed point.
V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous sections, we develop fixed point based decentralized strategies. To compute its strategy, each agent needs to know, in the uniform without initial preferences case, its own state and the initial distribution of the agents, and in the nonuniform with initial preferences case, its own state, the initial distribution of the population and the distribution of the dynamic parameters and vector of preferences. In the next theorem we show that these decentralized strategies are optimal in an approximate game theoretical sense with respect to the costs (2) and (17), in that they constitute an −Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6: If E x 0 i 2 < ∞ then the decentralized strategies u * i for i = 1, . . . , l constitute an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
with N converges to zero as N goes to infinity.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the collective decision-making mechanisms (without initial preferences), we consider 500 agents initially drawn from a Gaussian distribution N ((−10 0) T , 5I 2 ) and moving in R 2 according to the dynamics
Each agent makes a choice between the destination points p 1 = (−39.3, −10), p 2 = (−27, 9.5) or p 3 = (0, 40) under a social effect of strength q (q is the coefficient that penalizes on the deviation from the mean). We start by the case where the social effect is negligible (q = 0). In this case, the unique fixed point of F ∞ is λ = (0, 0.25, 0.75). Accordingly, quarter of the population go towards p 2 (see Fig.1 green balls) and the rest towards p 3 (see Fig.1 yellow balls) . When the social effect increases to q = 4, some of the agents, that have chosen p 2 as a destination in the absence of a social effect, change their decision and follow the majority (see Fig.1 blue balls (q = 4)). In this case, we compute a fixed point of F ∞ using Broyden's method. We find λ = (0, 0.16, 0.84). When the social effect reaches q = 6, a consensus to go towards p 3 occurs. All the agents, that went towards p 2 in the absence of a social effect, change their decision and go towards p 3 (see Fig.1 Blue balls). Moreover, the mean perfectly replicates the anticipated mean as shown in Figure 2 (q = 4).
VII. CONCLUSION
We consider in this paper a dynamic noncooperative game model for collective choice in multi-agent systems. In the simplest form of the game, the agents' final decisions are dictated by their initial positions. Subsequently, we generalize the model to include initial individual preferences towards the destination points. Moreover, we consider a nonuniform population. Using a mean field game theoretic framework, we establish that multiple −Nash strategies may exist. To compute its individual control strategy, each agent needs to know its own state, the initial distribution of the agents, and in the nonuniform case with initial preferences, the distribution of the dynamic parameters and the distribution of the vector of preferences.
